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Abstract
Prior research has been unable to explain the phenomenon known as post-earnings announcement drift, raising
questions concerning the semi-strong form efficiency of the market typically assumed in capital market research.
This study contributes to our understanding of this anomaly by examining drift in the context of theories that
consider investors' non-Bayesian behaviors. The empirical evidence reveals that investors' overconfidence about
their private information and the reliability of the earnings information are two important factors that explain drift.
Finally, this study also provides insight into the puzzling relationship between dispersion and drift discussed in prior
research.
Researchers remain puzzled by the way a company's stock price responds after earnings announcements: the price
continues to drift up if the earnings surprise is positive and down if negative. This phenomenon is called postearnings announcement drift (hereafter, drift). Attempts to explain drift as compensation for risk or as a result of
flaws in research design have thus far been unsuccessful. Drift appears to represent a form of mispricing, and the
accumulated evidence is inconsistent with the traditional view that prices immediately reflect all public information
(i.e., capital markets are semi-strong form efficient).
Recent literature attributes pricing anomalies, such as drift, to information processing biases (i.e.,
deviations from Bayesian behaviors). This study empirically examines two predictions that arise from such biases:
(1) overconfidence in private information; and (2) overconfidence in less reliable information and underconfidence
in more reliable information. In the first case, the models of Daniel et al. (1998) and Fischer (2001) demonstrate
that drift can arise when some investors overreact to their private information, coupled with their self-attribution
biases.1 As a consequence of their overconfidence, these investors overweight their private information and
underweight public information such as earnings reports. Under the assumption that these investors can move prices,
these models predict that more heterogeneous information across investors should be associated with a higher level
of drift.
In the second case, drift arises from investors' underreaction to reliable information. Griffin and Tversky
(1992) hypothesize that the pattern of over [end of page 321]-confidence and underconfidence observed in human
behavior is explained by investors' focus on the strength or extremeness of the available evidence (e.g., favorable or
unfavorable earnings information) with insufficient regard for its weight or credence (e.g., the reliability of the
earnings information). This hypothesis leads to the prediction that investors tend to underreact to information that is
relatively more reliable. Thus, more drift occurs when the earnings information is more reliable.
My empirical tests employ analyst forecasts to construct proxies for the degree of private information and
the reliability of the public earnings information. Analyst forecasts likely represent a good proxy for investors'
information because financial analysts play an important role in the stock market as information intermediaries
(Schipper, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). I use the correlation in forecast errors across analysts to derive my
proxy for investors' private information. Specifically, when the correlation in forecast errors is low, more
heterogeneous information is available in the market, implying more private information among investors. When
analysts receive more reliable earnings information, the precision (uncertainty) of analyst forecasts increases
(decreases). Therefore, I define the level of uncertainty as the expected squared error in individual forecasts
averaged across analysts and measure the reduction in uncertainty around earnings announcements as a proxy for the
reliability of earnings information.
The empirical tests examining the relationship between these proxies and drift provide evidence consistent
with both hypotheses. Specifically, drift has a significantly positive relationship with heterogeneous information and
significantly negative relationship with the change in uncertainty around earnings announcements. These results are

consistent with the notion that drift can be partially attributed to investors not processing all information in a
statistically correct fashion. Restated, the results suggest that the reliability of the earnings information released in
the earnings announcement and investors' overconfidence about their private information are two important factors
that lead to drift. These results appear robust to a number of sensitivity tests, such as controlling for systematic risk
(beta).
This study also provides insight into the puzzling relationship between forecast dispersion and drift
discussed in prior research. Both Alford and Berger (1997) and Dische (2001) predict that disagreement among
analysts, proxied by dispersion, is positively related to drift. In contrast, the authors in both studies find a negative
relationship between dispersion and drift. Consistent with dispersion being a function of both uncertainty and
disagreement, my empirical analyses provide evidence that the negative relationship is primarily attributable to the
level of uncertainty.
The empirical results are consistent with claims that post-earnings announcement drift represents market
inefficiencies arising from investors' non-Bayesian behaviors. In particular, this study's primary contribution is to
provide evidence that investors' information processing biases partially explain drift. This paper also builds on a
literature focusing on the role of cognitive biases in investors' reactions to analyst forecast revisions (Gleason and
Lee, 2002). Understanding such biases may provide insights into methods to deliver or present accounting
information in ways to minimize such interpretation issues or biases. However, this study represents only an [end of
page 322] indirect test, since investors' non-Bayesian behaviors cannot be measured directly. Nevertheless, this
paper is a first step empirically linking drift with information processing biases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides the hypothesis development and
research design. Section 2 discusses the data sources and variable measures. Section 3 reviews the empirical results.
Section 4 then discusses the supplemental tests, and Section 5 concludes.
1. Hypothesis Development and Research Design
1.1. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Many studies document drift over the last three decades. Early work demonstrates that abnormal stock returns are
predictable up to two months after annual earnings announcements (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968) and up to 60
trading days after quarterly earnings announcements (e.g., Jones and Litzenberger, 1970; Foster et al. 1984; Bernard
and Thomas, 1989). However, despite repeated attempts, prior research has failed to provide a satisfactory
explanation for drift.
Recent studies find that market participants underreact to earnings surprises and do not fully understand the
implications of current earnings for future earnings. While these studies claim that drift is due to a market
underreaction to the current earnings surprise (e.g., Freeman and Tse, 1989; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990;
Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Bartov, 1992; Ball and Bartov, 1996; Soffer and Lys, 1998), the cause of this
underreaction is unclear. Some researchers argue that the market underreacts to earnings surprises because
transaction costs prevent investors from making profits by trading on drift (Bhushan, 1994). However, this
explanation begs two difficult questions. First, why would transaction costs cause the initial underreaction to new
information, as opposed to simply introducing noise in price or causing overreaction? Second, if a trade ultimately
does occur, why shouldn't it occur at a price that fully reflects the public information?
Theoretical studies (e.g., Daniel et al., 1998; Fischer, 2001) demonstrate that market underreaction occurs
when investors are overconfident about their private information. Private information in this construct is not
necessarily better or insider information, but rather heterogeneous information that could come from either different
information sets or different interpretations of the same information. Drift occurs when some investors overweight
their heterogeneous information and underweight the public earnings announcements (non-Bayesian investors).2 For
example, in financial markets, market participants generate information for trading through means such as
interviewing management, verifying rumors, and analyzing financial statements. If some investors are more
confident about signals or assessments with which they have greater personal involvement, they may tend to be
overconfident about the information they have generated relative to public signals. Such behavior could induce drift.
[end of page 323]
Based on psychological biases such as investors' overconfidence about their private information, coupled
with self-attribution biases, Daniel et al. (1998) propose a theory of securities market underreactions. Cognitive
psychological experiments and surveys provide a large body of evidence about investors' overconfidence. Daniel et
al. (1998) define an overconfident investor as one who overestimates the precision of his private information signal,
but not of information signals publicly received by all. Consequently, stock prices underreact to public signals such

as earnings. Further, they claim that because the model is based on overconfidence about private information, return
predictability will be strongest in firms with the most heterogeneous information.
To consider Daniel et al. (1998)'s model, one might expect that fully rational investors can profit by trading
against the mispricing. If wealth flows from non Bayesian traders to "smart traders," eventually the "smart traders"
may dominate price-setting and the non-Bayesian traders may not survive in equilibrium. Fischer (2001) provides a
theoretical link between investors' overconfidence about their private information and the presence of drift, which is
consistent with Daniel et al. (1998). Specifically, he models a setting where investors who process information in a
non-Bayesian way can survive in the market under the assumption of imperfect security market competition and
inelastic security demand. Thus, an overreactionheuristic trading behavior is economically viable, in the sense that
it may perform better than Bayesian trading behavior. Fischer (2001)'s model predicts that drift arises when some
investors are non-Bayesian and that more drift is associated with more heterogeneous information among investors.
The studies above provide a theoretical link between drift and investors' nonBayesian behaviors,
specifically their overconfidence about private information.3 Since more heterogeneous information magnifies the
impact of investors' overreaction to private information, more heterogeneous information leads to more drift.
Following these arguments, I hypothesize that when investors have more heterogeneous information about the firms'
earnings, more drift appears after earnings announcements:
HI:

Drift is positively associated with the degree of heterogeneous information among investors.

Drift also can be positively related to the reliability of the earnings information, which is another indication that
investors do not process information in a statistically correct fashion. Bloomfield et al. (2000) argue that prices tend
to overreact to unreliable information and underreact to highly reliable information because investors' confidence in
their information is moderated toward a central level. They refer to this phenomenon as "moderated confidence"
because investors' confidence is moderated toward an average level that is insufficiently high or low.
In Bloomfield et al. (2000)'s experiment, securities values are determined by a coinflipping exercise
adapted from Griffin and Tversky (1992). Griffin and Tversky (1992) argue that people update their beliefs based on
the strength and weight of new evidence. The strength of evidence is the degree to which it is favorable or [end of
page 324] unfavorable. The weight of evidence is its statistical reliability or sample size. They measure "weight" as
the number of times the coin is flipped and "strength" as the sample proportion of heads. The more flips observed,
the more reliable the information contained in the proportion. Unlike equal numbers of heads and tails, they assume
that flipping a coin leads to a 50% bias favoring heads or 50% bias favoring tails. A heads-biased coin comes up
heads 60% of the times it is flipped and a tails-biased coin comes up tails 60% of the times it is flipped. According
to Bayes' rule, a signal strength of 58.8%, from 17 flips (10 heads and 7 tails), has the same probability as a signal
strength of 100%, from three flips (3 heads and 0 tails). In both cases, the probability that the bias favored heads is
77%.4 However, people tend to think the second case has a high probability of heads (100% > 58.8%) because they
are not very sensitive to the number of flips. If investors are Bayesian rational, they will respond appropriately to the
observed strength of the signal. Otherwise, they will tend to underestimate the probability of highly reliable signals
and overestimate the probability of highly unreliable signals.
Using the coin-flipping exercise as an example, Griffin and Tversky (1992) provide a theory capable of
predicting both under- and over-confidence in decision-making processes. Consistent with Griffin and Tversky
(1992)'s theory, investors tend to be underconfident and underreact to more reliable information such as public
earnings announcements. In fact, Bloomfield et al. (2000)'s experimental results show that markets under-react more
to more reliable information than they do to less reliable information.5 Thus, more drift is associated with more
reliable information. When investors receive reliable earnings information, their uncertainty about firms' future
performance decreases after the earnings announcement. I measure the level of uncertainty right before and after
earnings announcements and use the difference in the level of uncertainty around earnings announcements to proxy
for the reliability of the earnings information. As more reliable information leads to a greater reduction in investors'
uncertainty about firms' future performance, I hypothesize that drift is negatively associated with the change in
uncertainty around earnings announcements:
H2:

Drift is negatively associated with the change in uncertainty around earnings announcements.

1.2. Variable Measures and Research Design
I use analyst forecasts to proxy for the degree of heterogeneous information and the reliability of the earnings
information. Analyst forecasts likely represent a good proxy for investors' information, because financial analysts
play an important role in the stock market as information intermediaries and their earnings estimates directly assist

investors in making trading decisions (Schipper, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). In fact, recent studies use the
mean analyst forecast as a proxy for the market's expectation of earnings and show that drift is related to analyst
forecasts [end of page 325] (e.g., Mendenhall, 1991; Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Alford and Berger, 1997; Liu,
1998; Wu, 1998; Shane and Brous, 2001).
1.2.1. Heterogeneous Information
My measure of heterogeneous information concerns the correlation in forecast errors across analysts. Specifically, I
measure the correlation in forecast errors as the average correlation between one analyst's forecast error and other
analysts' forecast errors, denoted ρ. The correlation in forecast errors (ρ) estimates the degree to which analysts share
the same beliefs or how much the average (mean) belief reflects common versus private information. When all
available information is common,6 all analysts' beliefs are identical and ρ = I. As ρ approaches zero, the amount of
private information rises and analysts' beliefs diverge more from the average belief. Thus, I use 1-ρ to proxy for the
amount of private information or disagreement among analysts.
My measure of heterogeneous information is different from forecast dispersion, a proxy for disagreement in
prior research. First, forecast dispersion represents sample variance of analyst forecasts, while my measure of
heterogeneous information is the correlation in forecast errors across analysts. Second, my measure of
heterogeneous information is hypothesized to have a positive relationship with drift, while both Alford and Berger
(1997) and Dische (2001) find that dispersion, as a proxy for disagreement among analysts, is negatively related to
drift.7 The seemingly contradictory results may be due to dispersion relating to two factors, one of which runs
counter to the hypothesized positive relationship between drift and heterogeneous information. Barron et al. (1998)
(hereafter BKLS) model forecast dispersion as a function of both uncertainty and disagreement (1-ρ). Thus, if
uncertainty is held constant, dispersion could proxy for disagreement (i.e., measured as (1-ρ)), and would be
positively associated with drift. However, neither Alford and Berger (1997) nor Dische (2001) are clear about
controlling for other factors when they use dispersion as a proxy for disagreement. Thus, the negative relationship
between dispersion and drift observed in their studies could result from dispersion being mainly driven by
uncertainty in their samples. I examine this possibility and provide further discussion of dispersion in the
supplementary tests.
1.2.2. Uncertainty
I measure the level of residual uncertainty as the expected squared error in individual forecasts averaged across
analysts. When analysts are uncertain about a firm's future performance, they tend to have larger forecast errors.
When analysts are certain about a firm's performance, they make forecasts for that firm with smaller errors. A large
decrease in forecast errors after earnings announcements is consistent with a large decrease in analyst uncertainty.
The decrease in analyst uncertainty is consistent with analysts receiving very reliable new information. Thus, I
measure [end of page 326] the change in uncertainty by taking the difference in the level of uncertainty, measured
before and after earnings announcements. I use this change in analyst uncertainty to proxy for the reliability of the
earnings information released from the earnings announcements.
1.2.3. The Regression Model
I include the level of heterogeneous information after earnings announcements and change in uncertainty before and
after earnings announcements in the model to test HI and H2. In addition, I control for firm size, as prior research
has documented that drift is inversely related to firm size (Foster et al. 1984; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990;
Bhushan, 1994; Ball and Bartov, 1996; Alford and Berger, 1997). I estimate the following model:

where
is the cumulative abnormal return after quarterly earnings announcement q for firm j, and
measures unexpected earnings using analyst forecasts of earnings announcement q for firm j.
is my proxy for
the degree of heterogeneous information after earnings announcement q of firm j and is measured by 1-ρ, where ρ is
the correlation in forecast errors across analysts.
is the change in uncertainty, measured as the difference before
and after earnings announcement q of firm j. The coefficients of
and
indicate the relationship between drift
and measures of heterogeneous information and change in uncertainty among analysts. Based on prior studies, the
coefficient is predicted to be positive and to be negative. The hypotheses tested in the current study predict that
the coefficient should be positive (i.e., HI) and should be negative (i.e., H2).

To minimize problems associated with outliers, as in Bernard and Thomas (1990) and others, UE decile
numbers (0, 0.1, 0.2, ... , 1) are used instead of the actual standardized unexpected earnings. Observations for each
of the other independent variables are also divided into deciles from 0 to 1. Bernard and Thomas (1990) and
Bhushan (1994) argue that the coefficient of the unexpected earnings is the abnormal return on a zero-investment
portfolio when UE is measured as deciles from 0 to 1. Under this scheme,
measures the return on a zeroinvestment portfolio, consisting of firms with the smallest values of
. The coefficient
measures the incremental change in this return if the
decile was the highest instead of the lowest, all else equal.
A similar interpretation holds for and .
2. Data
The data come from three sources. This study uses one-quarter-ahead, oneyear-ahead and two-year-ahead forecasts
of earnings-per-share from the 2001 [end of page 327] Institutional Brokerage Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Detail
file. Actual quarterly and annual earnings-per-share amounts and adjustment factors for stock splits and stock
dividends are also from the I/B/E/S detail data. Earnings announcement dates are obtained from the 2001 Compustat
combined quarterly files. Share price, returns and shares outstanding are from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) tapes. The data are organized by firm-quarters. Firm-quarters missing any of the above data are
excluded from the sample. In addition, some firms are excluded from the

[end of page 328]

sample because they release their earnings announcements for the fourth quarter of one year and the first quarter of
the following year on the same day. Finally, I also exclude firms with two earnings announcement dates for the same
quarter. The final sample consists of 20,966 firm-quarter observations for 3,335 firms from January of 1989 to
December of 2000. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure and the year-by-year sample size.
I examine the sample period from 1989 to 2000 for two reasons. First, the dating of IBES forecasts, which
figure prominently in the calculation of my variables, has been shown to become more reliable around 1990 (Barron
and Stuerke, 1998). Second, this study focuses on a contemporaneous sample period. The most recent tape available
is 2001, so the period covered offers the best extant data.
The forecasts used to measure heterogeneous information and change in uncertainty around earnings
announcements have the following characteristics. To be included in my analysis, an analyst must issue a one-yearahead annual earnings forecast within 45 days before the quarterly earnings announcement q (the pre window), and
the same analyst must issue a revised one-year-ahead annual earnings forecast within 30 days after the quarterly
earnings announcement q (the post window). For the fourth quarter, I require two-year-ahead earnings forecasts
within 45 days before earnings announcement q and one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions within 30 days after
earnings announcement q for the next fiscal year end. I require forecasts to be the most recent ones relative to the
earnings announcement dates (the latest forecasts in the pre-announcement window and the first forecasts in the
post-announcement window by the same analysts). I use one-year-ahead annual forecasts of earnings per share
reported within 30 days following earnings announcement q to calculate
(which is 1-ρ). The forecasts in the
preannouncement and post-announcement windows are used to measure the level of uncertainty before
and
after
earnings announcement q of firm j respectively. The change in uncertainty
is estimated as
and
is then scaled by the square of the adjusted closing stock price on the 45th day before
earnings announcement q of firm j.8 Firm-quarters that do not have one-yearahead annual forecasts made by at least
two analysts in the pre- and -post-earnings announcement windows (two-year-ahead forecasts for the fourth quarter
in the preearnings announcement window) are excluded from the sample. [end of page 329]
The forecasts used to measure earnings surprises
have the following characteristics. One-quarterahead forecasts of quarterly earnings per share reported within 45 days before earnings announcement q are used to
calculate
, which is then scaled by the adjusted closing stock price on the 45th day before earnings
announcement q of firm j. Firm-quarters that do not have one-quarter-ahead forecasts made by at least two analysts
during that period are excluded from the sample. I measure
as the actual quarter earnings-per-share minus the
onequarter-ahead mean forecast.
I use one-year-ahead earnings forecasts (two-year-ahead forecasts for the fourth quarter in the pre-earnings
announcement windows) to compute heterogeneous beliefs and change in uncertainty. I use one-year-ahead
forecasts for two reasons. First, recent research (Liu and Thomas, 1998) documents that long-term forecasts, such as
annual earnings forecasts, are more price relevant than short-term forecasts. Liu and Thomas (1998) argue that
earnings components that have lower value relevance (e.g., transitory and price irrelevant earnings shocks) are more
likely to show up in short-term earnings forecasts, whereas fundamental changes in profitability are more likely to
be reflected in long-term forecasts. Second, I require that firms have at least two annual forecast revisions made by
the same analysts before and after earnings announcements, which dramatically reduces the sample as shown in
Table 1. Since one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts are the most frequent forecasts that analysts make,9 I adopt
one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts instead of long-term growth forecasts (two-year-ahead forecasts for the
fourth quarter in the pre-earnings announcement windows) to have a reasonable sample size, and to be consistent
with prior drift studies.
Following BKLS's model, I measure both heterogeneous information and change in uncertainty by using
the properties of analyst forecasts. While we cannot observe the underlying properties of the analysts' information

environment, we can observe the properties of their forecasts. I calculate dispersion in analysts' forecasts as the
sample variance of forecasts,

where
is the most recent annual earnings forecast around the earnings announcement by analyst
is the mean
forecast, and N is the number of forecasts around the earnings announcements. SE is defined as the squared error in
the mean forecast in BKLS,
where y is the actual annual earnings per share and is the mean forecast. BKLS define consensus as the correlation
in forecast errors across analysts (ρ). Following the BKLS model, I measure consensus (ρ) and uncertainty (V) by
using properties of [end of page 330] the widely available earnings forecast data:

where D, SE, and N are measures of forecast dispersion, squared error in the mean forecast and the number of
forecasts, respectively.
Consistent with prior studies of drift, I calculate the cumulative size-adjusted abnormal return
after
earnings announcement q for firm j. The daily abnormal return for firm j on day
is computed as the difference
between the daily return of firm j and the mean return of a firm-size decile that firm j is a member of:
where
is the daily raw return for firm j on day t and
is the equally weighted mean return on day t of the
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firm size decile (excluding Unit Investment Trust, Closed-End Funds, Real Estate
is the sum of daily
Investment Trusts, Americus Trusts, Foreign Stocks, and American Depository Receipts).10
abnormal returns of firm j over the sixty-trading day interval (1, 60), where 1 is one day after earnings
announcement q. Bernard and Thomas (1989) demonstrate that drift behavior is largely unaffected by either risk
adjustments or compounding rather than summing returns. Thus, I adopt this cumulative size-adjusted return to be
consistent with most drift studies, in addition to controlling for firm size in the multivariate OLS regression model.
Nonetheless, I examine the potential effect of risk on my results in the sensitivity analyses discussed later.
I measure size as the market value of common equity on the 45th day before the earnings announcement
for quarter q. The market value of common equity is the product of the closing stock price and the number of current
shares outstanding on that day. Finally, I transform all the independent variables including
and
into deciles, based on their sample distributions within calendar quarters. Zero represents the smallest decile of each
variable and nine represents the largest. I then scale deciles by nine to range between zero and one.
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Sample Description
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the independent variables. The mean of unexpected earnings
(UE) is slightly negative (- 0.09% ), which is consistent with analysts being optimistic in general. UE values greater
(less) than 5 (- 5) are winsorized to 5 (- 5), consistent with prior research (Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Bhushan,
1994).11 The median of the correlation in forecast errors across analysts (ρ) is [end of page 331]

where is the most recent annual earnings forecast revision around the earnings announcement by analyst is the
mean forecast, and N is the number of forecasts around the earnings announcements. ρ: The correlation of forecast
errors across analysts or the BKLS consensus is estimated as follows:

where D is the forecast dispersion, the sample variance of one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts reported within
30 days following earnings announcement q for each firm; N is the number of those forecasts; SE is the squared
difference between the IBES actual annual EPS and the mean of those forecasts. Those forecasts are the first
revisions made by the same analysts who made one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts within 45 days before
earnings announcement q. Firm-quarters that do not have forecasts made by at least two analysts during the pre and
post earnings announcement window are excluded from the sample. [end of page 332] 0.82, which is consistent
with Barron et al. (2002)'s median of ρ, 0.85, after the second quarter earnings announcement. The average firm size
in my sample is relatively large ($6,046 million) because I require that firms have at least two one-quarter-ahead
quarterly forecasts and at least two one-year-ahead annual forecast revisions.
Panel B of Table 2 provides Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients (the upper triangle is Spearman
correlation coefficients). Note that there are high correlations among the variables ρ, ΔV and SIZE. Also, dispersion
has highly positive correlations with the level of uncertainty (Vafter) and highly negative correlations with the
correlation in forecast errors across analysts (ρ) in both Spearman and Pearson correlations, which is consistent with
dispersion being a function of the level of uncertainty and the correlation in forecast errors across analysts as
suggested by BKLS.12
Table 3 describes the drift of each decile portfolio formed based on rankings of unexpected earnings (UEjq)
within calendar quarters. Drift represents the means of the cumulative size-adjusted return (CARjq) over the trading
days window (1, 60). Prior research reveals that drift is typically negative following negative earnings surprises and
positive following positive surprises. The estimates of drift in Table 3 are consistent with past evidence on earnings
surprises and drift. Larger earnings surprises are almost monotonically associated with larger drift measures.
Vafterjq: The level of uncertainty after earnings announcement q for firm j scaled by the adjusted closing stock price on the 45th day before
earnings announcement q. Vafterjq is estimated as:

where I compute D, N and SE using the most recent one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts revisions reported within 30 days following
earnings announcements.
ΔV: The change in uncertainty is estimated as the difference between the uncertainty before and after the earnings announcement (Vafter-Vbefore)
and scaled by the adjusted closing stock price on the 45th day before earnings announcement q. Those forecasts are the most recent forecasts (the
latest forecasts in the pre window and the first forecasts in the post window by the same analysts). Firm-quarters that do not have forecasts made
by at least two analysts during the pre and post earnings announcement window are excluded from the sample.
SIZE: The market value of common equity at the 45th day before earnings announcement q. The market value of common equity is the product of
the closing stock price and the number of current shares outstanding on that day.

3.2. Regression Results
Panel A of Table 4 replicates the evidence for drift in an OLS regression. As expected, the results show that the
coefficient estimate on the unexpected earnings variable (UEjq) is positive and significant. The coefficient (6.3%)
represents returns on a zero-investment portfolio with long (short) positions in firms within the highest (lowest)
decile of unexpected earnings. The magnitude of 6.3% is higher than the range of 4.2% to 5.3% abnormal returns
over the 60 trading days subsequent to the earnings announcement documented by Bernard and Thomas (1989). The
adjusted [end of page 333]

R2 is 0.009, which is low but consistent with prior drift studies (e.g., Alford and Berger (1997) document an adjusted
R2 of 0.006). Drift still varies with firm size in a bivariate OLS regression (untabulated), which is consistent with
most drift studies (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Raedy, 1998).
Panel B of Table 4 reports results for model (1), a multivariate OLS regression, using size-adjusted
returns.13 The coefficients for both the heterogeneous information variable (HIjq) and the change in uncertainty
variable (ΔVjq) are statistically significant and have the predicted signs. The coefficient estimate on the unexpected
earnings variable (UEjq) is 0.087 and significant at the 1% level. The parameter estimates of UEjq * HIjq and UEjq *
ΔVjq are 0.022 and - 0.064, both significant at the 1% level. These results imply that the return to a zero-investment
portfolio, consisting of firms in the lowest HI decile, ΔV decile and SIZE decile, with a long position in UE decile 10
and a short position in UE decile 1, is 8.7%. The incremental change in the above return is 2.2% if positions are
taken in the highest as opposed to [end of page 334]

the lowest HI decile. If the positions are taken in the highest ΔV decile, the incremental change is - 6.4%. The
regression results fail to provide evidence that drift still varies with firm size after controlling for heterogeneous
information and change in uncertainty effects.14 The adjusted R2 is 0.012, which is improved about 33% compared to
Panel A of Table 4. Even though this adjusted R2 is relatively low, it is consistent with the drift literature. For
example, Bartov et al. (2000) examine drift using multivariate OLS regression models similar to model (1), and their
R2s range from 0.011 to 0.015.
The regression results are consistent with both hypotheses and show that drift is positively related to the
degree of heterogeneous information and negatively related to the change in uncertainty around earnings
announcements. The results are consistent with drift being attributable to investors not processing all information in
a statistically correct fashion. Specifically, the results are consistent with a common implication of two models that
drift arises when some investors overreact to heterogeneous information. The results also suggest that drift arises
when investors underreact to highly reliable earnings information. [end of 335]
4. Supplementary Tests
4.1. Using Risk-Adjusted Returns
To evaluate the possibility that failure to adjust for risk drives my results, I use the risk-adjusted return (CARBjq) in a
sensitivity test. I measure daily risk-adjusted abnormal return for firm j on day t (ARBjt) as the difference between
the daily return of firm j and the expected return of firm j. To estimate the expected return for firm j over the 60trading day interval, I adopt the market model to estimate α and β by using the raw return for firm j and the equallyweighted mean return on day t of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firm size decile that firm j is a member of. I estimate
α and β over a 300-trading day interval (- 345, - 45) with a minimum requirement of 250 trading days, where - 45
denotes 45 days before earnings announcement q:

where Rjt and Rpt are as defined in equation (6); α and β are the intercept and the risk factor estimated over the 300trading day interval. CARBjq represents the sum of daily risk-adjusted abnormal returns of firm j on day t(ARBjt) over
the 60-trading day interval (1, 60), where 1 is one day after earnings announcement q.
Panel A of Table 5 displays evidence for drift in an OLS regression using riskadjusted returns. As
expected, the coefficient estimate on the unexpected earnings variable (UEjq) is positive and significant. The
coefficient (1.3%) represents returns on a zero-investment portfolio with long (short) positions in firms within the
highest (lowest) decile of unexpected earnings. The magnitude of 1.3% is smaller than the range of 4.2% to 5.3%
abnormal returns over the 60 trading days subsequent to earnings announcements documented by Bernard and
Thomas (1989), and the adjusted R2 (0.0003) is lower as well. However, the reported statistics are consistent with
the argument by Ball et al. (1993) that drift relates to the risk factor (Beta) but is not eliminated by controlling for

risk. Drift still varies with firm size in a bivariate OLS regression (untabulated), which is consistent with most drift
studies (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Raedy, 1998).
Panel B of Table 5 reports results for model (1), a multivariate OLS regression using risk-adjusted returns.
Consistent with the results in Panel B of Table 4, the coefficients for both heterogeneous information (HIjq) and
change in uncertainty (ΔVjq) are statistically significant, having the predicted sign. The coefficient estimate on
unexpected earnings (UEjq) is 0.034 and significant at the 1% level. The parameter estimates of the interaction
terms, UEjq * HIjq and UEjq * ΔVjq, are 0.064 and -0.096, both significant at the 1% level. These results imply that
the return to a zeroinvestment portfolio is 3.4%. The zero-investment portfolio consists of firms in the lowest HI,
ΔV and SIZE deciles, with a long position in UE decile 10 and a short position in UE decile 1. The incremental
change in the above return is 6.4% if positions are taken in the highest as opposed to the lowest HI decile. If
positions are [end of page 336]

taken in the highest ΔV decile, the incremental change is - 9.6%. The regression results provide evidence that drift
still varies with firm size after controlling for heterogeneous information and change in uncertainty effects at the 5%
significance level.15 Finally, the adjusted R2 is 0.009.
4.2. Issues Related to Forecast Dispersion
Prior studies conjecture that forecast dispersion can proxy for disagreement and is related to drift. Dische (2001)
relies on Hong and Stein (1999) and Daniel et al. (1998)'s theory and predicts that return profitability from the
momentum trading strategy is higher with higher information asymmetries. Using dispersion as a proxy for
information asymmetry, he actually finds the opposite from what he had predicted and what one might expect based
on the evidence I present in Table 4.16 Similarly, Alford and Berger (1997) also find a negative relationship between
dispersion and drift. [end of page 337]
The seemingly contradictory results about how dispersion relates to drift may be a result of dispersion
being comprised of two factors, one of which countervails the positive association between drift and dispersion.
BKLS specifically model forecast dispersion as follows:
where D is forecast dispersion, V is the level of uncertainty and ρ is the correlation in forecast errors across analysts
or consensus. As revealed in equation (9), dispersion is determined by both V and (1 - ρ). Thus, if V is held constant,
dispersion could proxy for disagreement, which is (1- ρ), and would be positively associated with drift. However,
neither Alford and Berger (1997) nor Dische (2001) are clear about controlling for other factors when they use
dispersion as a proxy for disagreement. The negative relationship between dispersion and drift observed in their

studies could result from dispersion being mainly driven by uncertainty in their samples. Thus, dispersion is related
to two countervailing factors and likely not a good proxy for disagreement.
I conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate how drift relates to dispersion. The results in Table 6 show
that the negative relationship between dispersion and drift is primarily attributable to the level of uncertainty. First, I
estimate the following regression to examine how dispersion is related to drift beyond the firm-size effect:
Consistent with both Alford and Berger (1997) and Dische (2001), dispersion is negatively related to drift (- 0.03)
and highly significant at the 1% level. Second, I add uncertainty (VanerJq) into the regression and examine how
dispersion is related to drift after controlling for the level of uncertainty:

The results from the multivariate regression fail to provide evidence that dispersion is negatively related to
drift after controlling for the level of uncertainty. Further, the coefficient of the uncertainty variable is- 0.068 and
highly significant at the 1% level. The size variable is negatively related to drift and highly significant. The
condition index of 8.13 fails to indicate severe multicollinearity, suggesting that the insignificant coefficient of
dispersion is not attributable to collinearity. The overall results are consistent with dispersion relating to multiple
factors.
4.3. Other Tests
I also conduct several diagnostic tests, adding the following additional control variables to my primary regression.
First, I control for the number of analysts (N) around each earnings announcement in the sample. I use N to proxy
for the [end of page 338]

information flow around earnings announcements that is incremental to the size variable.
Second, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that high trading volume (turnover) magnifies price-based
momentum in the intermediate-term. High volume is also associated with high dispersion (Barron, 1995). Since
price momentum and earnings momentum are related (Chan et al., 1996), I add both volume and price momentum in
the model to control for the spurious relationship among volume, price momentum and drift, which is correlated
with the heterogeneous information variable (HIjq) I measure volume as the average daily turnover in percent during
the [end of page 339]

45 days before earnings announcement q, where daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded each day
to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day. I use the compound return over the six months prior to
earnings announcement q to capture the price momentum.
Third, to examine whether the results vary across positive versus negative earnings surprises, I also add a
dummy variable (Sign) in the model. Sign equals one when earnings surprises are positive, and zero otherwise.
Lastly, to control for differential persistence in the earnings signal across my sample, I add the P/E ratio as
a proxy for persistence. As prior studies (Ali and Zarowin, 1992; Baber et al., 1999) show, extremely high (low)
earnings-price ratios indicate that earnings are transitorily high (low), while nonextreme ratios indicate that earnings
are predominantly permanent. I adopt the mean annual earnings forecast within 45 days before earnings
announcement q scaled by the adjusted closing stock price on the 45th day before earnings announcement q as the
earnings- [end of page 340] price ratio.17 I then divide all firm-quarters with positive earnings into nine groups (1, 2,
... , 9) with an approximately equal number of firm-quarters per group. All firm-quarters with negative earnings are
in group 0. I classify firm-quarters in the middle six groups as I and firm-quarters in the bottom and top two groups
as 0.
Results are robust to adding the above variables. The coefficients for both the heterogeneous information
variable (HIjq) and the change in uncertainty variable (ΔVjq) are statistically significant and have the predicted signs
after controlling for the number of analysts, volume, price momentum, the sign of earnings surprises and earningsprice ratios.18 In particular, the coefficients of HIjq and ΔVjq are 0.026 and -0.064, both significant at the 1% level.
Consistent with prior studies (Barron, 1995; Chan et al., 1996; Lee and Swaminathan, 2000), the coefficients of
volume and price momentum are both positive (0.047 and 0.029) and significant at the 1% level. The evidence
suggests that drift varies across positive and negative earnings surprises and more drift is associated with positive
earnings surprises. The coefficient estimate of Sign is 0.033 with a 1% significance level. The regression results fail

to provide evidence that drift varies with firm size and the number of analysts after controlling for other variables.
The coefficient estimate of the earnings-price ratio (PE) is 0.012 with a 5% significance level, consistent with the
argument that greater drift is associated with more persistent earnings.
5. Conclusion and Future Research
The empirical evidence in this study lends credence to claims that anomalies, such as post-earnings announcement
drift, represent market inefficiencies arising from imperfect information-processing behavior by investors. The
results indicate that post-earnings announcement drift can be partially attributed to investors' information processing
biases: (I) overconfidence in private information and (2) overconfidence in less reliable information and
underconfidence in more reliable information. Specifically, the empirical evidence reveals that drift has a positive
relationship with heterogeneous information and negative relationship with the change in uncertainty around
earnings announcements. These results are consistent with the notion that investors' non-Bayesian behaviors can
lead to drift. Finally, this study also provides insight into the puzzling negative relationship between dispersion and
drift discussed in prior research (Alford and Berger, 1997; Dische, 2001). While the latter studies predict a positive
relationship between dispersion and drift, my paper provides evidence that the observed negative relationship is
likely driven by the level of uncertainty, suggesting dispersion is a function of both uncertainty and disagreement.
This study is of interest for several reasons. First, I view this paper as a first step in empirically linking drift
with information processing biases. An anomaly is not an anomaly once people understand the factors that cause it.
An important contribution of this study is to identify factors that may partially explain drift. Second, this study
should help people develop some decision aids to mitigate investors' information processing biases after realizing
that drift is related to those [end of page 341] biases. In particular, analysts may change the way they make
decisions after taking into account these non-Bayesian behaviors. Similar to a language, accounting information
communicates key signals regarding a firm's financial health. Likewise, financial disclosure is a key process in
accounting; therefore, presenting information in certain formats may help investors infer information correctly and
avoid those biases. Future research may examine whether other anomalies documented in finance and accounting
research, such as the accrual anomaly documented by Sloan (1996), can be explained by investors' non-Bayesian
behaviors. Future research may also consider investors' information processing biases in other contexts, such as the
effect of a new accounting standard or disclosure policy.
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2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Notes
In this setting, private information is not necessarily better or insider information, but rather heterogeneous
information that could come from either different information sets or different interpretations of the same
information.
Non-Bayesian investors are investors who cannot process all information in a statistically correct fashion. This
kind of behavior could be due to investors' psychological biases, such as overconfidence about their private
information.
Hong and Stein (1999) examine a setting where the market underreaction occurs among newswatchers. They
define newswatchers as investors who rationally use fundamental news but ignore prices. To some extent, their
setting can be interpreted as assuming that newswatchers overreact to fundamental news and drift occurs
because of newswatchers' overreaction.
Refer to footnote 2 in Bloomfield et al. (2000) to calculate 77%.
Gleason and Lee (2002) show that investors' cognitive limitations help explain a significant portion of the
delayed price response to individual analyst forecast revisions.
Common information refers to information that is shared by all analysts.
Diether et al. (2002) also document a negative relationship between dispersion and future returns, although they
do not examine drift.

8.

9.
10.

II.
12.
13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

18.

If the 45th day is not a trading day or price is not available, I collect the adjusted closing stock price within two
days around the 45th day. Consistent with prior research (Christie, 1987), I choose price as the deflator. The
results are qualitatively the same if I use the mean earnings forecast as the deflator. [end of page 342]
One-year-ahead annual forecasts are about twice as frequent as one-quarter-ahead quarterly earnings forecasts,
and are about seven times as frequent as long-term growth forecasts.
All eligible NYSE firms are ranked by market capitalization on the last trading day of each quarter. Ten equally
populated portfolios, or deciles, are then formed. Stocks that are traded on the AMEX and NASDAQ are
placed into these deciles according to their respective market capitalization using the NYSE breakpoints (1996
CRSP Access97 Indices File Guide, WRDS).
The regression results are insensitive to this winsorization.
Refer to equation (9) in the supplementary test.
I employ two alternative measures for the size-adjusted return (CAR): (I) starting 3 days after the announcement
q through 60 trading days after the announcement q, and (2) starting 30 trading days after the announcement q
through 60 trading days after the announcement q. Results are qualitatively the same to those presented.
Since most variables on the right-hand side of the regression are measured using analyst forecasts and Panel B
of Table 2 shows high correlation among variables ρ, ΔV and HI, I conduct a diagnostic test for
multicollinearity. The estimated condition index (7.04) recommended by Belsley et al. (1980) fails to provide
evidence of significant multicollinearity in the regression model.
As in Table 4, I conduct a diagnostic test for multicollinearity, with the condition index of 7.04 failing to
provide evidence of significant multicollinearity in the regression model.
His study differs from mine because he examines the German market, whereas I focus on the US market. In
addition, he examines the returns after revisions in analysts' forecasts, whereas postearnings announcement
drift relates to returns after earnings surprises.
I also use actual EPS scaled by the closing stock price from the previous quarter (q - I) as a measure of the
earnings-price ratio. In addition, I add the book-to-market (B/M) of previous quarter (q -I) as a proxy for
growth and the monthly number of analyst estimates from the IBES summary data in the model. Adding new
variables reduces the sample size, although the results still hold.
As done previously, I also employ two alternative measures of size-adjusted returns (CAR): (I) starting 3 days
after the announcement q through 60 trading days after the announcement q and (2) starting 30 trading days
after the announcement q through 60 trading days after the announcement q. In addition, I also examine betaadjusted returns (CARB) for this analysis. Results are qualitatively the same across all specifications.
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